enhance standards of living, such as health care, education, pension, and unemployment programs. Viewed within the context of the larger global community, these  states share a number of important characteristics: democracy, capitalism, a half-century or more of political and economic stability, a high standard of living, culture, and status in the global arena, to name a few of the most obvious. Yet when one looks at this small and seemingly homogenous group of countries in isolation, it does not take long before the policy differences become apparent.
Perhaps the most significant and most analyzed source of variation among these countries is the extent to which they manage the free market's self-regulating mechanism in an attempt to combat some of the unpleasant external costs which the market tends to ignore (if not cause). In other words, some countries are more willing than others to let the 'invisible hand' govern itself, even though while producing a socially desirable allocation of resources it simultaneously offers some people little more than a nasty punch in the nose. More to the point, if the market provided universal health care and education, as well as care for the elderly and unemployed, it would be unnecessary for governments to do so, but the governments of all advanced capitalist democracies do indeed provide such services to compensate for the market's inadequacies, though programs vary a great deal from country to country in terms of their funding level, range, duration, and eligibility requirements. Given this well-documented diversity (Esping-Andersen's  The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism being the hallmark study), along with the significance of public opinion to democratic governance, it seems worthwhile to inquire as to whether or not these clear differences between countries' public policies are reflected in similarly clear differences in the attitudes of their citizens.
Following a review of the relevant literature and a brief methodological discussion, this paper will proceed to accomplish three specific tasks. As a foundational first step, I will briefly justify my methodological decision to rely on EspingAndersen's () decommodification index as a policy indicator later in the paper. Second, we will undertake a direct comparison of cross-national values in order to assess whether or not countries do indeed cluster together with respect to values as they do in terms of social policy. Last we will address the issue of causality. Data limitations render more advanced statistical tests implausible, but it is possible, through simple correlation and regression analyses, to compare the strength of the relationship between public opinion and policy against a number of variables previously found to affect the variation among advanced capitalist democracies.
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY
According to Webster's Dictionary (Mish, , p. ), the term democracy, based on its Greek roots, means 'government by the people' or 'rule of the majority'. Direct democracy, which would be the most straightforward application of the concept, is fraught with logistical and theoretical complications which render it impractical at best, dangerous at worst. As such, democracy as it is practiced in modern nation-states is largely of the representative variety. Policy makers are chosen by their fellow citizens to represent community interests in the political process, or in other words, public opinion shapes governmental policy. So goes the theory, at any rate, but to what extent does policy reflect public preferences in the real world?
As Burstein () has noted, the causal relationship between public opinion and public policy is an understudied area of inquiry in the social science literature. More common are projects which attempt to decipher the basic nature of public opinion (such as Free & Cantril, ) Iversen & Soskice, ) . However, political science research has yielded a couple of important findings in answer to the question of whether public opinion input does indeed influence public policy output.
Page and Shapiro () provide a pioneering study in the effort to uncover the causal dynamics at work by comparing changes in both public opinion and public policy in the United States and find that public opinion often has at least a proximal affect on policy. And while feedback between the two certainly seems to be present, it is indeed public opinion which seems to cause policy more often than the reverse. However, they caution against any grand illusions about the representativeness of the American political system, noting that fairly simplistic research design necessitates further study before such a claim could be made. Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson () develop the notion of 'dynamic representation' and, through the use of a more advanced statistical model, find that each branch of American government, and indeed the government as a whole, is highly responsive to changes in public opinion. Focusing on defense spending in the United States, Wlezien (, ) addresses the feedback issue by conceptualizing public opinion as a 'thermostat', which registers responses to existing government policies (or changes in them), so that government can in turn respond by adjusting policy until it coincides with the public's preferences. Though some of the specifics of the complicated causal relationship remain elusive, studies such as these provide an important foundation by convincingly establishing the fact that public opinion does play a role in shaping public policy, at least in terms of the American example, as democratic theory suggests.
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM
The body of literature which seeks to make sense of the significant variation in terms of government policy and social outcomes among seemingly homogeneous advanced capitalist democracies is perhaps more developed than that on the causal relevance of public opinion (though it has by no means answered all of its own relevant questions). As mentioned previously, Esping-Andersen () provides us with the most widely-accepted typology for classifying these countries. Beginning with the notion that social outcomes are more important than the mere existence of programs or the amount spent on them, Esping-Andersen focuses on the explicitly Polanyi-esque concept of decommodification, or the degree to which social programs 'emancipate individuals from market dependence' (, p. ), as the crucial feature differentiating  advanced capitalist democracies from one another. Because basic human needs must be met on a consistent basis, labor is different from the other factors of production in that its price cannot realistically fall below subsistence level in the medium or long term. Decommodification is used as a measure of the degree to which a country's residents are able to secure basic needs free from exposure to the unpredictability of market forces (supply and demand).
Measuring decommodification through an analysis of old-age pensions, sickness benefits, and unemployment insurance, Esping-Andersen finds that countries naturally separate into three distinct clusters. The Social Democratic model characteristic of the Nordic states, which promotes equality and social rights through a relatively high degree of market intervention, provides a level of benefits that effectively reduces the gap in standard of living between rich and poor. The Conservative (or Christian Democratic or corporatist) model of continental Europe (Japan is placed here also), with an emphasis on social stability and a preservation of hierarchical class or status relationships, provides substantial universal benefits, but not at a level sufficient to achieve any significant redistributive effect. Lastly, the Liberal model of the Anglo-American countries, epitomized by a relatively heavy reliance on the market mechanism and therefore relatively little protection from it, offers means-tested benefits, typically in paltry amounts and with strict eligibility requirements, to a relatively few citizens. Esping-Andersen's investigation indicates that none of these models is epitomized in any one country as an ideal type, but that three distinct clusters do indeed emerge.
Combining Esping-Andersen's important analysis with the above discussion about the relationship between policy and public opinion, we arrive at the question which serves as the foundation for this analysis. Are there variations in public opinion from country to country which mirror (and may in fact underlie) the observed variations in managing the social effects of a capitalist economy? This question has been addressed previously by both Coughlin () and Svallfors (, forthcoming). Among Coughlin's key findings is a discernable relationship between social policy and mass ideology, marked by a striking absence of hardcore laissez-faire sentiment, in the eight countries he studies. Similarly, Svallfors has also found some evidence of a fit between public opinion and welfare type across eight countries, using a four-way classification scheme developed by Castles and Mitchell () . The problem with these studies, as addressed by both of the authors themselves, is limited data availability, which, like a nagging fly, perpetually plagues anyone who studies comparative public opinion (and certainly goes a long way toward explaining the relative dearth of studies in this area). Coughlin, writing over two decades ago, was largely forced to rely on the pasting together of various surveys conducted independently in the eight countries which made up his sample. The obvious problems are that interesting questions asked in one country may not be asked in another, and, even if they are, the translation of the questions may be different enough that the results are rendered incomparable. Svallfors, writing just a few years ago, had quite a few more options, but has confined his analysis to the in-depth coverage of a single survey, and a relatively small number of questions, which in turn limited him to a relatively small number of countries. The benefits of this approach are an enhanced level of conceptual precision, but the costs are that the results of one survey may be contradicted by another (see Mehrtens, ) . While it may come with the price of somewhat reduced specificity, this project will attempt to contribute to the pioneering efforts of both of these researchers by following the same line of inquiry, but looking at more countries, more questions, more surveys, and more time, in an effort to simultaneously decipher a number of available surveys.
IDEOLOGICAL VS. OPERATIONAL ATTITUDES
Free and Cantril () identify a crucial split between ideological and operational attitudes among the American public. That is, Americans tend to give very conservative (laissez-faire, anti-government, etc.) responses to broad ideological questions, but then tend to respond in favor of specific policy programs, such as health care, education, and the like, which helps explain why such programs persist despite an enormous amount of anti-government (or at least minimal government) rhetoric in American political discourse. As mentioned above, Coughlin () applies this logic to his comparative analysis and achieves a similar result. Specifically, he finds that public opinion toward specific spending programs (operational attitudes) vary little across countries (consistently high support), but that responses to broad, general questions (ideological attitudes) do vary to a significant degree, and in accordance with the documented cross-national variation in policy outcomes. As we shall see, this insight will be vital in our efforts to make sense of the survey data analyzed in this study.
CAUSES OF VARIATION AMONG ADVANCED CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES
The literature on welfare state development has identified a number of key variables that have contributed to the formation of distinct types of policy orientation. For example, within the tradition of power resources theory (Korpi, ; Stephens, ), both left government and unions have been found to positively affect welfare state development through the political mobilization of previously marginalized societal segments (particularly workers) that have much to gain from government social activism. Similarly, numerous authors (Schmitter, ; Katzenstein, ; Crouch, ; Hicks, ) have cited the presence of corporatist bargaining arrangements as a key to the emergence of more extensive social programs, as the very definition of the term entails a level of cooperation and compromise between business and labor in which the latter repudiates its more radical tendencies (such as the abolition of private property) in exchange for concessions such as health coverage and unemployment assistance (Przeworski, ) . As an indicator of institutional legacy, Hicks () discusses early program consolidation, arguing that those countries with a lengthy history of governmental generosity can be expected to display similar characteristics in the present. Huber, Ragin, and Stephens () find that constitutional structure affects welfare state development by determining whether narrow majorities will have the opportunity to veto populist policies.
HYPOTHESES
Based on the established findings discussed above, we are able to derive and test three specific hypotheses. First, if we know that there is a relationship between public opinion and governmental policy, and we know that advanced capitalist democracies vary significantly in terms of their policies and outcomes, then we should expect them to exhibit similar differences with respect to country-level mass attitudes. Specifically, my hypothesis is that support for social programs should be higher in Social Democratic than in Christian Democratic countries, and Christian Democratic states should in turn bear the same relationship with respect to Liberal countries. Next, within the context of testing our first hypothesis we must incorporate Free and Cantril's () and Coughlin's () results regarding operational and ideological attitudes into our comparative analysis. Based on their work, we expect to find very little variation between countries on questions of specific policy (which register widespread support), but a great deal of variation on questions of broad ideology, and variation consistent with the Three Worlds typology (Esping-Andersen, ). Last, it is expected that a brief empirical examination will show that public opinion merits further attention as a significant cause of welfare state variation.
SAMPLE, DATA, AND METHODS
In an attempt to extend the efforts of Coughlin () and Svallfors (, forthcoming) , and consistent with the large body of work in comparative politics on advanced capitalist countries (such as Esping-Andersen, ), this study will focus on the following  countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
Mention of this group of countries necessitates an immediate turn to the issue of data availability because, while it would be nice if the hypotheses generated above could be examined in light of survey responses from each of these  countries, this is unfortunately not the case, and that needs to be made clear from the outset. As with previous analyses of cross-national attitudes, this project suffers to some extent from spotty data coverage, though the relatively recent emergence of the International Social Survey Program, World Values Survey, and Eurobarometer data are an immeasurable improvement over what was previously available and indeed have made this project possible.
The significance of these three surveys is that they represent coordinated efforts to ask important and interesting questions of a fairly sizable sample in a number of different countries at roughly the same time, and just as importantly, in successive versions. The International Social Survey Program (or ISSP) was organized in , is structured around specific social science themes (for instance, the 'Social Inequality' and 'Role of Government' studies analyzed here), and has grown to include  countries. The World Values Survey (or WVS) has been conducted in three waves (, -, and -) and has covered more than  societies in various combinations throughout those three waves. The Eurobarometer has, since the early s, conducted twice-yearly topicallyoriented surveys of European countries (one problem with Eurobarometer from the perspective of this project is that it includes only one country from the Liberal cluster, the somewhat anomalous Great Britain, to compare against an armada of Social Democratic and Christian Democratic counterparts-as the name of the survey implies, this is, at least for my purposes, simply an unfortunate side-effect of its geographical focus and in no way reduces the contribution of the survey as a whole). Once again, the extent to which these three survey projects have facilitated comparative studies of the type undertaken in this study cannot be overstated. 1 An important caveat must be issued here about interpreting poll responses: when attempting to draw broad conclusions from these surveys, with some questions it is essential that one does so only in the context of existing national circumstances. In other words, some questions ask for relative rather than absolute responses, which are necessarily shaped by the respondent's own personal experiences within her country. For example, Question  in the  ISSP survey 1 In some cases the data files contain information on response rates, in other cases they do not. In still other cases, response rates are completely unavailable. For the ISSP Role of Government surveys, response rates (RR  according to the 'Standards and Best Practices' page of the website for the American Association of Public Opinion Research, www.aapor.com) as available in the data files range from  percent (France, ) to  percent (USA, ); for the ISSP Social Inequality surveys from  percent (France, ) to  percent (USA, ). A compilation of the response rates contained in the data files is available from the author. asks whether income differences in the respondent's country are too large, and Americans are more likely than Norwegians to answer in the affirmative. So can we conclude from these results that Americans are more concerned than Norwegians about inequality? Clearly we cannot because inequality is much higher in the US than in Norway, so to some extent we should probably expect this result. But when we look at Question  from Wave  of the World Values Survey, which calls for a comparison based on a one-to-ten response scale where one indicates that incomes should be made more equal and ten denotes that larger income differences are needed as an incentive for effort, the results suggest that Americans are more comfortable with inequality than are Norwegians, as intuition might imply.
Methodologically, this essay is rather crude, perhaps necessarily so given the nature of the data. Much of what is presented is simply my own analysis of the survey data. However, bivariate correlations and simple regression equations will be utilized to test for both fit and causality between attitudes and policy.
A few notes need to be made here regarding data presentation. First, to maintain theoretical consistency, and for ease of presentation, countries will be grouped according to Esping-Andersen's 'Three Words' typology in all relevant tables within this paper (the reasons for this approach will be explained in the next part of the paper). On that note, there has been some disagreement about which cluster best fits a couple of countries. Probably the most questionable among the choices I have made are the placement of Ireland into the Liberal group and the Netherlands into the Social Democratic group. I have done so because this approach is the most conservative from a research perspective, as it lessens the difference in mean cluster scores and thus should make it harder to find the hypothesized pattern. Second, rather than merging the second and third waves of the WVS and presenting the most recent results from each country (which would provide a sample size of ), poll results from the two waves will be listed separately. This is because there is a noticeable shift in all countries toward a pro-government stance between the two waves, rendering the results of the two surveys largely incomparable-what looks like a relatively liberal aggregate response in Wave  becomes a relatively conservative response in Wave  (for more on this, see Mehrtens, ) . Finally, in all of the tables I have listed each of the  sample countries, regardless of whether survey data exist for all countries in that particular table. While this may be a bit unusual, I have presented the results in such a manner to provide an ongoing indicator to the reader of exactly which data we are working with in comparison to what we would optimally like to have available.
DECOMMODIFICATION AS AN INDICATOR OF POLICY VARIATION
Before turning to the substantive results of this study, it is necessary to tackle one last methodological issue, namely the exclusive reliance on Esping-Andersen's () decommodification index as my preferred indicator of variation in social policy among advanced capitalist democracies, both in this paper and throughout the larger study of which it is but a part. While I do feel the need to justify this approach, I take comfort in the facts that many respected and influential researchers hold the decommodification index in such high regard, and it is certainly among the most (if not the single most) cited work within the body of literature on welfare state variation. To be fair, Esping-Andersen's typology has generated both criticism and alternative classification schemes (see Castles & Mitchell, ; Sainsbury, ; Gornick, Meyers, & Ross, ; Hicks & Kenworthy, ; Edwards, ), but as Goodin, Headey, Muffels, and Dirven (, p. ) note, 'not only does it remain the firm focus of most on-going discussions in these areas, it has by now become a well-established landmark in relation to which any subsequent work . . . must situate itself'. The point here is not to unduly reify Esping-Andersen's classification scheme, but rather to justify its centrality within my own analysis.
Theoretically rooted in the influential work of Karl Polanyi (), decommodification, in Esping-Andersen's own words, 'occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market' (, p. -). As mentioned earlier, actual decommodification scores used in Esping-Andersen's analysis are operationalized as a combination of pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits, according to characteristics such as replacement rates, eligibility rules, and duration of coverage. The variation in these characteristics from country to country provides evidence of differing levels of decommodification, thus resulting in Esping-Andersen's familiar 'Three Worlds' typology. Decommodification scores for each of our sample countries are listed by cluster in Table  .
Perhaps most importantly, the use of decommodification figures as an indicator of policy variation is justified by the fact that it is very highly correlated with the alternative measures one might logically use in its place. For example, decommodification is very highly correlated with alternative policy indicators, such as welfare effort (Hicks & Misra, ; Hicks, ) and economic freedom (Fraser Institute, ). It is highly correlated with indicators of policy performance, such as reductions in poverty and inequality, as well as with social outcomes such as post-tax and -transfer poverty and inequality (Hicks & Kenworthy, ) and social indicators such as those relating to health, literacy, and crime (Mehrtens, forthcoming) . In sum, many of the variables mentioned above could be used as an indicator of variation among advanced capitalist democracies, but I have chosen Esping-Andersen's decommodification scores because there seems to be a national economic, political, and social orientation which characterizes advanced capitalist democratic countries and which the decommodification index seems to capture, both in the numbers and through the historically rooted theory.
VARIATION IN PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Given that national policies and outcomes cluster as they do into Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Liberal groups, it seems logical to assume that national attitudes might follow a similar pattern. That is, we might reasonably expect citizens in Social Democratic countries to hold more favorable views toward government spending programs than those in Christian Democratic countries, and we would expect citizens in Liberal countries to be the most hostile toward those same services. 
GENERAL RESULTS
At first glance, the relationship between differences in public opinion and differences in national policy orientations appears to be rather weak. In response to a substantial number of questions, our paradigmatic understanding of the differences between advanced capitalist democracies seems to display at best an unimpressive relationship to differences in country-level public opinion. In general, among the countries which come across as the most consistently supportive of government programs are some of our Conservative states. For example, respondents in these countries are among the most likely to feel that income differences in their country are too large (ISSP, , Question ), incomes should be made more equal (WVS, Waves  and , Question ), government is not doing enough to fight poverty (Eurobarometer, , Question ), and society is unfair (Eurobarometer, , Question ), as we see in Table  . As further evidence, note the mean scores for each cluster, which show that it is the Conservative group which generally displays the most pro-government sentiment. Simultaneously, some of our egalitarian Social Democratic countries produce responses to the political right of some of our typically more anti-government Liberal states on a number of questions, though this seems largely related to the aforementioned issue of absolute vs. relative questions. Swedes, for example, are more likely than Americans or Australians to feel that people should provide for themselves rather than relying on the government (World Values Survey, Waves  and , Question ) and if one were to focus only on the  version of the ISSP (not to be confused with the first data column of Table  , which provides the most recent result for each country), it would appear that respondents in the US, Great Britain, and New Zealand are more likely to see inequality as a problem than are citizens in Norway (ISSP, , Question ).
What is quite clear, however, is that our Liberal countries consistently tend to congregate at the conservative end of the distribution with respect to survey responses, regardless of the question asked. For example, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States are among the most likely to argue that larger income differences are needed as an incentive for effort (WVS, Waves  and , Question ), and those polled in Australia, Canada, and the US are among the least likely to favor an increase in government ownership at the expense of private ownership (WVS, Waves  and , Question ). Respondents in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US are among the least likely to feel that the government should reduce inequality (ISSP , Question , and , Question ). Similarly, Australians, Canadians, and Americans are among the least likely to feel that government should provide a basic income (ISSP , Question  and , Question ). Other countries do occasionally provide responses similar to those of the Liberal countries, but it is generally not the same country with any degree of regularity (with the possible and highly unexpected exception of Sweden). Likewise, Liberal countries may produce atypical responses from time to time, but they generally tend to cluster together at one end of the distribution (with the possible and also unexpected exception of Great Britain). Once again, comparison of the mean responses for each cluster may provide the clearest indication of the overall picture. This discussion is not meant to imply that no pattern emerges, just that the pattern is not as clear as anticipated. In general terms, the picture painted by the data is of a fairly obvious split between our Liberal countries, on the one hand, and our Social Democratic and Conservative countries, on the other, but then with no discernible gap between Social Democratic and Christian Democratic countries. This, perhaps not coincidentally, corresponds to an intermingling of Esping-Andersen's own decommodification scores between the two groups (see Table  ), and may provide evidence that the real-world differences between the two clusters are rather subtle.
TWO EXCEPTIONAL CASES-GREAT BRITAIN AND SWEDEN
Looking below the surface, there seem to be two specific reasons for this mediocre fit between variation in opinion and policy. The first is the emergence of two highly anomalous cases-Sweden and Great Britain (also noted briefly by Svallfors, ; Ginsburg, , p. , perhaps most accurately refers to Britain as 'an odd mixture of the "socialist" and "liberal" types'). The former is, of course, considered the preeminent example of an active and generous welfare state, successfully combating poverty and inequality through extensive government programs, the high taxes necessary to fund them, and an extraordinary level of social cohesion, while the latter is generally viewed, particularly in the popular media, as a lone European bulwark trying to pull her continental counterparts in the direction of a U.S.-style capitalism based on individualism, competition, and minimal governmental interference.
However, survey results show these characterizations to be grossly exaggerated, if not downright erroneous, with respect to the mass attitudes of Swedish and British citizens, as we see by again looking at Table . Sweden, for its part, as of the most recent polling, is the country most likely to favor inequality as an incentive for effort (WVS, Wave , Question ), among the least likely to argue that income differences are too large (ISSP, , Question ), among the most likely to feel that citizens, rather than government, should provide for themselves (WVS, Wave , Question ), and among the least likely to see competition as harmful (WVS, Wave , Question , not included in the table). Great Britain, on the other hand, is among the countries most likely to argue that competition is harmful (WVS, Wave , Question ) and that government should provide a basic income (ISSP, , Question ). The British are also among the most likely to view success as the result of luck and connections rather than hard work (WVS, Wave , Question , not included in the table) and see the world in zero-sum rather than positive-sum terms (WVS, Wave , Question , not included in the table). In response to some survey questions, those polled in Sweden and Great Britain respond more as one might expect given their more general national orientations. However, it would not be an overstatement to suggest, based on the poll results analyzed here, that the British public generally holds attitudes which are more receptive to governmental activism and more hostile toward the free market than those of their Swedish counterparts.
This discussion of Sweden and Great Britain needs to be viewed in light of the issue of relative and absolute questions discussed earlier. That is, Swedish citizens might be less likely than British citizens to support increased governmental activity because their government is already quite active in, not to mention successful at, managing the economy for the sake of larger social goals. However, I maintain that the larger point about the anomalous nature of these cases remains valid. Comparing Sweden's responses with the cluster means, Sweden often produces results most similar to the Liberal group, while Great Britain is consistently far more likely than any of the other Liberal countries to display interventionist tendencies. This raises one further question. If it is just about relative vs. absolute questions, why does Sweden so often look different from the other Social Democratic countries, and why does Great Britain appear even more strikingly different from its Liberal counterparts? Norway and Denmark both have active governments which successfully manage social problems through market intervention, and the US and Australia both have relatively uninvolved governments which let social outcomes be determined by market forces, but in all of these cases, mass attitudes bear at least a general resemblance to governmental orientation. It is only Sweden and Great Britain which consistently emerge as anomalous. Clearly the dynamic process by which public opinion is translated into public policy in these two countries deserves further attention.
IDEOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ATTITUDES
The second and more important reason for an apparently unimposing fit between public opinion and public policy concerns the nature of the questions themselves. As the work of Free and Cantril () suggests, and as Coughlin () indeed finds, we might expect our preliminary finding of a merely modest fit between variation in attitudes and variation in policies to change if we consider the distinction between ideological and operational attitudes. That is, we should find similar (and generally high) levels of support, across our sample of countries, for specific public spending programs, but we should find mixed levels of support for broader ideological questions, with variation occurring in accordance with each country's general policy orientation, as evidenced by a much stronger relationship between differences in mass attitudes and decommodification scores.
Examination of simple bivariate correlations allows us to reach some basic conclusions. Tables  and  provide evidence of the operational-ideological dichotomy, thereby reinforcing Coughlin's () results and establishing the validity of the Three Worlds paradigm in the context of cross-national public opinion. As we can see from the first four correlations presented in Table  (the  aggregated country-level data are presented in Table ) , which are based on data from the ISSP's Role of Government polls, the relationship between decommodification scores and four specific policy-oriented questions, which ask whether the respondent would like their government to increase spending on health, education, pensions, and unemployment, respectively, even if doing so might −.**  ISSP, , Q.  require a tax increase (ISSP, , Questions , , , and ), is unimpressive to say the least. The correlations for three of the four propositions are statistically insignificant, and the fourth, regarding education, is highly significant, but negative, contrary to expectations. This is a noteworthy finding because this is the same battery of questions analyzed by Iversen and Soskice (), in which they argue that differences in vocational training (general vs. specific) shape policy variation among advanced capitalist democracies, through a simple rationalitybased effect on citizen preferences. Turning to the second four correlations in Table  , however, we see that more broadly ideological questions concerning similar issue areas are asked within the same survey, but produce a much different outcome. Specifically, respondents were asked about the role of the government in providing for the sick, the elderly, the unemployed, (ISSP, , Questions , , ) and in reducing inequality (ISSP, , Question , , Question, , and , Question ) and aggregate results for three of the four questions are significantly and positively correlated with decommodification scores (the fourth, regarding health care, just misses significance at the . level, seemingly due to the low French response, but still provides a much better fit than the related item in the specifically policyoriented battery of questions).
Merely rephrasing the questions in a more broadly ideological, rather than policy-specific, manner drastically alters the goodness of fit between variations in mass attitudes and public policy. To be fair, the results diverge somewhat from what we should expect based on Coughlin's () results, which, as mentioned before, show that specific policy questions draw universally high support, but then broader ideological questions draw high levels of support in some countries, and lower levels of support in others, with the result being a pattern which corresponds closely to policy variation. What we see here, particularly for the questions on health care and pensions, is fairly high levels of support in all countries (all at or above  percent for both questions), but the variation that exists is more highly correlated with the decommodification index (the questions regarding unemployment benefits and reducing inequality do more closely correspond with Coughlin's results). One might also argue that the caveat about higher taxes in the first battery of questions merely introduces a distortion to the respondent but that these are both series of questions which are inherently policy-oriented, rather than ideological in nature. I will, of course, leave this issue to the judgment of the readers, though I would argue that the second battery of questions ('is it the responsibility of the government to . . .') is a step towards broader ideology as compared to the first ('would you like to see more or less . . .'), and as we will see momentarily, the fit with policy variation gets even better as we move to questions which are even more removed from specific policy.
The remaining correlations in Table  are between decommodification and six other interesting and relevant questions of broad ideology, each of which also displays a strong relationship. The last five of these questions, in particular, all pertain in some way to the notion of social justice, and all are significantly correlated with variation in policy orientation. Focusing specifically on the last two items in Table  , it is particularly instructive that Great Britain and Sweden exhibit aggregate responses more as one might expect, confirming that it is these questions of broad ideology which really matter. These results imply that those countries which provide more for their citizens in terms of social policy are populated by citizens who have a more expansive conception of social justice, as opposed to their counterparts living under less-generous governments. While the causal relationship between preferences and policy is obviously complicated, it seems clear that people are, at least to some extent, getting what they want from government, in comparative context. At the aggregate level, those who favor a more egalitarian society get a more active government which provides more extensive services and lower levels of poverty, inequality, and other social problems. Those who hold less egalitarian views get smaller government, lessgenerous social programs, and social outcomes left relatively unchecked. It is thus fair to say that broad ideological attitudes do in fact vary in accordance with the documented variation in policy orientation.
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, the preceding analysis provides us with three clear conclusions. First, there is a sharp division in public preferences between Liberal countries, on the one hand, and Social Democratic and Conservative countries on the other, consistent with the decommodification numbers provided by Esping-Andersen (), if not as clearly consistent with the underlying theory. Second, Sweden and Britain emerge as anomalous cases, each consistently producing aggregate responses uncharacteristic of their roles as bulwarks of the Social Democratic and Liberal models, respectively. Finally, and most significantly, the operationalideological dichotomy works at the cross-national level, the result being a strong fit between cross-national differences in broad ideology and social policy (and an insignificant fit between policy and more specific policy preferences). This finding necessitates a cursory investigation of the possible causal link between the ideology and policy, and it is to this task that we now turn our attention.
CAUSALITY
Working with a sample of only  countries and then having relatively spotty data coverage leaves us in a position where the usual multivariate statistical procedures are rendered problematic. However, having established a statistically significant relationship between aggregate political attitudes and policy orientation, we can weigh public opinion alongside variables already known to shape welfare state variation. To do so, I have constructed two index variables using factor analysis to simplify the analysis and presentation. The first combines questions regarding the government's responsibility in providing health care, pensions, and unemployment assistance (ISSP, , Questions , , and , respectively), while the second combines questions asking whether it is just that money buys better health and education (ISSP, , Questions , and ).
For the record, these are the two clusters of questions which will be the focus of the larger study of which this essay provides a foundation (discussed below in the concluding section). The factor loadings for each are available from the author.
As we see in Table  , the relationship between public opinion (measured as the two indexed variables) and decommodification is roughly similar in strength to the relationships between decommodification and left government (measured as cumulative years of left government as of , based on data from Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, ), union density (unionized workforce as a percentage of total workforce via Huber et al., , and Visser, ), constitutional structure (index available from Huber et al., ), and early consolidation (measured as the average number of years that pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits have been both binding and extensive in each country via Hicks, , p. ), the dummy variable for early consolidation. However, a look at the standardized coefficients, combined with a reminder about the tiny sample sizes, indicates that this variable performs well enough to at least be included in the discussion about determinants of welfare state variation. The case is much stronger for the second indexed variable, which is a significant predictor of decommodfication scores at the . level in all cases except when paired with neo-corporatism (which is statistically, and perhaps theoretically, a virtual proxy for decommodification). Further, a relatively high portion of the variance in decommodification scores is achieved through most of these simple bivariate models. The fact that the second indexed variable performs better than the first is consistent with the previously discussed notion that it is broader ideology which is truly important in helping to shape policy variation among advanced capitalist democracies.
It is important not to overstate any causal claims given the temporal relationship between the public opinion and decommodification data. However, given the strength of the statistical relationship between public opinion and social policy and the strong causal link between public preferences and policy outcomes in democratic theory, it is clear that mass political preferences warrant increased attention as a significant cause of welfare state development. It certainly seems to be the case that, at least to some extent, citizens are getting what they want from their own governments, relative to each other, in terms of social policy, which implies that a thorough understanding of the variation among advanced capitalist democracies needs to incorporate the role of political ideology.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above evidence, four clear findings emerge in response to the hypotheses derived earlier in this study. First, there is a significant gap in mass attitudes between Liberal countries, on the one hand, and Social Democratic and Conservative societies on the other. Second, we find a relatively weak relationship between policy-related public opinion and the differences in social policy among countries, but we find a much stronger fit between broad ideology and policy variation, consistent with the distinction between ideological and operational attitudes offered by Free and Cantril () . Third, and in addition to our hypothesis-driven results, we unexpectedly find that Sweden and Great Britain emerge as clearly anomalous cases, and therefore complicate our analysis, in that they each seem to display the mass attitudes one would expect of the other-social democratic Sweden often comes across as relatively laissez-faire, even conservative, in terms of its aggregate poll responses, while liberal Great Britain often emerges as rather egalitarian and pro-government. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, crude correlation and regression analyses indicate that public opinion, particularly of the broader ideological variety, deserves consideration as an important determinant of welfare state variation.
As for future research, three possibilities come to mind. First, having established a relationship between public opinion and public policy within this data, it is necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of the forces which shape public opinion and the cross-national differences in it which we have observed here. Specifically, we need to develop a more accurate model of the social forces which shape attitudes at the individual level. Much recent work has focused on a sort of basic economistic approach, arguing that political preferences are formed by a simple cost-benefit analysis, whereby policies which financially benefit a particular individual are supported, while those that do not are opposed. This rationalitybased perspective seems flawed, however, in that it is both anti-historical and anti-sociological and therefore wrongly assumes that all similarly situated individuals will reach the same political decisions, regardless of social context, and particularly with regard to cross-national variation in that social context. Within the confines of this research project, this is the line of inquiry I will be following.
Second, the emergence of Britain and Sweden as anomalous cases raises interesting questions. Specifically, if Britain has such egalitarian and pro-government views, while Sweden exhibits such conservative and laissez-faire attitudes, how have they evolved into exemplars of the Liberal and Social Democratic models, as has been so well documented? There seems to be a mismatch between public opinion and public policy in these two countries which cries out for further examination.
The third suggestion is simply a continuation of the current line of inquiry as more data become available. Just as Coughlin () provided a first step, Svallfors (, forthcoming) provides a second, and this project hopes to provide a third, many more steps need to be taken before we can feel comfortable that we have a sound understanding of the comparative nature of public support for governmental spending programs. Given the important theoretical link between public opinion and public policy, it is crucial that we definitively ascertain the degree to which citizen preferences are reflected in the work of our elected representatives.
APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTIONS ISSP, -SOCIAL INEQUALITY III
Question : Differences in income in this country are too large-percentage answering 'strongly agree' or 'agree' (most recent result for each country).
Question : It should be or should not be the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes-percentage answering 'strongly agree' or 'agree' (most recent result for each country).
Question : Is it just or unjust-right or wrong-that people with higher incomes can buy better health care than people with lower incomes?-Percentage responding 'very just, definitely right' or 'somewhat just, right'.
